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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Respondent, i 
VS. 1 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, I 
Defendant/Appellant, J 
t Case No. 870412 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Theft of an 
Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree felony, and Possession of 
a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony after a trial in the 
Third Judicial District Court and after this Court granted 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) 
(Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the warrantless search of a stolen car lawful 
where defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy either 
because the car was stolen or because there is none in the VIN 
number, or, where the officer had probable cause to search? 
2. Was a mistrial warranted where a juror conversed 
with a relatively inconsequential witness prior to trial? 
3. Was defendant prejudiced where the record does not 
support his contention that two jurors saw him shackled in 
custody? 
4. Is possession of a stolen vehicle a lesser included 
offense of theft, thus, precluding defendant's conviction of both 
crimes under the facts of this case establishing that the theft 
and possession were committed on separate dates approximately 
four years apart? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Phillip Paul Larocco, was charged in Count I 
with theft of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) and S 76-6-412 
(1978), and in Count II with possession of a stolen vehicle, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 
(1981). Defendant was convicted as charged following a jury 
trial held December 9 and 10, 1985, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Dee on January 10, 1986, to concurrent terms 
of one to fifteen years and zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison on counts I and II respectively. 
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on August 
27, 1987. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987). The 
Court of Appeals denied defendant's petition for rehearing on 
October 6, 1987. This Court granted defendant's petition for 
writ of certiorari on January 26, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 16, 1981, defendant approached salesman David 
Luce at State Auto Sales in Salt Lake County and asked to take a 
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1973 Mach I Mustang for a test drive (R. 187). Defendant had 
visited Mr. Luce at the auto dealership on two previous 
occasionsf and on each of those occasions they had discussed 
Mustangs for about ten to fifteen minutes (R. 187-88). Because 
this was the third time he had met defendant and because there 
were no other employees at the dealership at that time, Mr. Luce 
permitted defendant to take the car for an unaccompanied test 
drive (R. 186-87). Mr. Luce told defendant that he could take 
the car around the block; however, defendant drove off and never 
returned (R. 187-88). Later that day, Mr. Luce or William 
Padilla, the owner of State Auto Sales, reported to the police 
that the Mustang had been stolen (R. 211 [T. 74]). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant was incarcerated in the 
Utah State Prison, having been convicted of an unrelated theft 
valued at about $90,000 (R. 349). Defendant was released from 
prison on February 12, 1985 (R. 348). 
In May of 1985, salesman David Luce, who had changed 
jobs and was working at Valley Ford in Salt Lake City, saw 
defendant at Valley Ford. Defendant was on the showroom floor 
talking with a salesman named Patrick Sullivan. Mr. Luce took 
Mr. Sullivan aside and said, "If that gentleman wants to go for a 
ride in a car, • . • you just make damn sure you go with him, 
because if you don't you'll not see him again." (R. 190). 
Defendant's incarceration in the Utah State Prison was not 
brought to the attention of the jury at trial. The 
incarceration, however, is an important factor to consider in 
determining whether defendant in this case could be convicted of 
both theft and possession of a stolen vehicle, as addressed in 
Point IV. 
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Defendant had given Mr. Sullivan a false name and address; he 
said his name was Phillip Wilson and that he lived at 7442 
Gardenia Avenue, a street number which did not exist (R. 31, 192, 
214-15). 
About three or four days later, Mr. Luce saw defendant 
at 39th South State, driving the Mustang that he had stolen from 
State Auto Sales in 1981 (R. 191). Mr. Luce called his former 
employer, William Padilla, and told him that he had seen the 
stolen Mustang, and Mr. Luce gave Padilla the name and address 
that defendant had given to the salesman at Valley Ford (R. 191-
92, 214). Mr. Padilla could not find the street number that had 
been given him by Mr. Luce. However, after looking around the 
area, Mr. Padilla found the Mustang parked on a street a few 
blocks away (R. 215). Mr. Padilla wrote down the license number 
and called the police (R. 215, 230). 
A few days later, Detective Linda Robison went to the 
location where Mr. Padilla had seen the Mustang (R. 230-31). 
Detective Robison found the Mustang parked in front of 
defendant's home; she checked the license plate and found that 
the car was registered to defendant (R. 232-33). Detective 
Robison checked the vehicle identification number ("VIN") that 
was listed on the car registration and found that the VIN was 
assigned to a 1973 Mustang that had been registered to Neil 
Hailes (R. 233). Mr. Hailes' Mustang had been completely 
destroyed in a car wreck on Christmas Eve of 1975, and the 
wrecked remains of the car were taken to a wrecking yard in Salt 
Lake County (R. 250-55). 
4-
On June 6, 1985, Detective Robison returned to the 
location she had previously seen the Mustang, accompanied this 
time by another officer and by Kip Ingersoll, an investigator 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles (R. 234). While standing 
outside the vehicle, the officers examined the VIN tag on the 
dashboard; the number was the same as the VIN belonging to Mr. 
Hailes wrecked Mustang (R. 252-37). The officers then opened the 
door of the car in order to observe the VIN located on the safety 
standard sticker; the sticker was located on the right side panel 
of the driver's door (R. 235-37, 244; Exhibit 1). This VIN was 
different from the VIN on the dashboard; the VIN on the door 
panel matched the VIN of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales 
(R. 235). 
Upon finding that the VIN on the safety standard 
sticker matched that of the stolen Mustang, the officers went to 
defendant's home, read him his Miranda rights, and arrested him 
(R. 238-40). Defendant told Detective Robison that he had 
purchased the car from Streater Chevrolet (R. 33, 239). 
Defendant's brother-in-law gave the officers the fraudulent 
certificate of title and the car was impounded (R. 240-41). 
Upon further investigation, Kipp Ingersoll found that 
the VIN tag on the dashboard had been affixed with tin foil and 
glue (R. 270-71). He also examined a secretly located derivative 
number (a slightly shortened form of the VIN) located under one 
of the car fenders and found that this identification number also 
matched the VIN of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales (R. 
271-73, 276). 
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At trial, defendant did not deny that the Mustang had 
been stolen, but attempted to convince the jury that Mr. Luce had 
misidentified him because he had incorrectly reported his weight 
(R. 309-12). 
The jury convicted defendant as charged of theft and of 
possession of a stolen vehicle (R. 325). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle that he stole; therefore, he has no 
standing to challenge the alleged search of the vehicle. If 
defendant is found to have standing, he nevertheless had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle identification 
number and, further, probable cause existed to search the vehicle 
without a warrant. 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a mistrial, made following a brief conversation between a 
peripheral witness and a juror. After a complete hearing on 
whether this contact would affect the case, the judge properly 
concluded that the State had rebutted the presumption of 
prejudice. 
The record does not support defendant's claim that the 
jury observed him in shackles in police custody, thus denying him 
a fair trial. 
Under the circumstances of this case, defendant was 





THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE STOLEN MUSTANG 
WAS LAWFUL AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF 
THE SEARCH. 
A. Defendant Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the 
Search of the Vehicle. 
The threshold question to defendant's claim that his 
rights given by the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
were violated is whether defendant has standing to challenge the 
search.2 In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has standing to 
challenge a warrantless search only if he or she can establish a 
"legitimate expectation of privacy" in the property searched. A 
defendant must "own or lawfully possess or control property" in 
order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy, jk*- a t 143 n. 
12 (emphasis added). 
Courts overwhelmingly agree that criminal defendants do 
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in vehicles they 
have stolen. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court declared, "A 
thief of property has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
stolen goods. And 'this court has refused to refused to 
recognized as 'reasonable' any expectation of privacy a thief may 
have in an automobile which he has stolen.'" State v. Harding, 
The "search" of the Mustang was extremely limited in scope and 
extended only to opening the door in order to view the VIN 
located on the safety inspection sticker lqcated on the right 
side panel of the door (R. 235-37, 244). 
-7-
670 P.2d 383, 396 (Ariz. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013 
(1983) (citations omitted); State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 
1981). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant who 
has not shown that he "owned or had a right to possess" a car has 
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of its search and 
seizure. State v. Bottelson, 625 P-2d 1093, 1095 (Idaho 1981); 
accord State v. McKinney, 687 P.2d 570 (Idaho 1984). The 
Colorado Supreme Court has held that "[s]ince the evidence [in 
the case] strongly points to the fact that the defendant stole 
[the] vehicle, it must be concluded that he has no proprietary or 
possessory interest in the vehicle upon which he can base 
standing to challenge the legality of its search." People v. 
Pearson, 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Colo. 1976); People v. Spies, 615 
P.2d 710 (Colo. 1980) .3 
This Court has also held that defendants do not have 
standing to object to the search of vehicles they do not 
rightfully possess. In all three cases cited by defendant, this 
Court denied standing to individuals who did not have legitimate 
The majority of courts have similarly held that a thief of a 
stolen vehicle has no standing to challenge a search of that 
vehicle. See, e.g., Sanborn v. State, 304 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 1983) 
(defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in stolen 
car); State v. Rivers, 420 S.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1982) (because 
vehicle was stolen, defendants "had no appropriate proprietary 
interest in that automobile, they had no reason to expect any 
privacy, and there was absolutely nothing wrong with the 
warrantless search"); Graham v. State, 421 A.2d 1385 (Md.App. 
1980) (defendant had no standing to object to search of stolen 
moped and backpack); Burns v. State, 438 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 
1983) (defendant's claim of unlawful search rejected "because the 
marijuana was found in a stolen automobile"); State v. White, 316 
S.E.2d 42, 46 (N.C. 1984) ("defendant had no legitimate 
expectations of privacy in the stolen vehicle"). 
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possession of the vehicles searched. State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 
1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (defendants who seek standing to challenge 
a warrantless search must demonstrate legitimate expectation of 
privacy ); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978) (facts 
showed that defendant had no possessory or proprietary interest; 
State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966) 
(defendant had no standing because he did n0t establish that he 
owned, or had legitimate possession of the car). 
In the present case, Detective Rofrison testified that 
upon being arrested, defendant claimed that he had purchased the 
Mustang from Streater Chevrolet in the Summer of 1984 (R. 239). 
Defendant made no efforts to substantiate this claim at any time, 
although he had ample opportunity to do so. Testimony given by a 
defendant in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth 
amendment grounds cannot be utilized by the prosecution at trial 
to establish a defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377 (1968). Thus, defendant had the opportunity to be 
completely open at the pretrial hearing and not have the evidence 
used against him. If defendant had, in faqt, purchased the car 
from Streater Chevrolet in the Summer of 1984, it would have been 
a rather simple matter to support this claim in some form during 
the hearing on the motion to suppress. Defendant contends, 
however, that his unsubstantiated claim of ownership entitles him 
to standing and that forcing him to support his claim would 
require a defendant to establish the ultimate issue in the case. 
The rule of virtually every court in this nation today 
is that evidence resulting from a police search is admissible 
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unless the accused establishes that his legitimate expectation of 
privacy was violated. Mere allegations of ownership do not 
suffice. In Rakas the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he proponent 
of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his 
own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged 
search or seizure." 439 U.S. 131 n. 1. The Rakas court rejected 
the defendants' claim because they made "no showing that they 
had any legitimate expectation of privacy" in the searched 
vehicle. Id,, at 148. See also Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98/ 
104 (1980) (the defendant must prove not only that the search was 
illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the object searched); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 
92 (1980) (no valid fourth amendment claim absent "a factual 
finding" that defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the area searched); United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788, 
790 (10th Cir. 1984) (fourth amendment claim regarding search of 
airplane depended upon whether the defendant "sufficiently showed 
lawful possession or control to confer standing," and was 
dismissed because he had "failed to show lawful possession of the 
plane giving rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy"); 
United States v. Oregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984) (no 
standing because defendant did not prove that he had legitimate 
expectation of privacy in automobile); State v. Bottelson, 625 
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Idaho 1981) ("defendant had the burden of 
proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
[car]"); People v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 3132, 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 
(Colo. 1976) (to Hestabli8h standing to challenge a Bearch and 
-10-
seizure, the challenger has the burden of alleging and proving 
that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy"). 
In State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 
1966), this Court also held that evidence seized is admissible 
unless the accused establishes that his rights were violated. 
M[I]t is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge 
he legality of a search as a basis for suppressing relevant 
evidence that he alleges, and if the allegation be disputed that 
he establish, that he himself was a victim of an invasion of 
privacy." JId. at 960. Further, in State y. Constantino, 732 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); 
nor State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978), this Court has 
made no indication that it would be reluctant to follow the well-
settled rule that a defendant must prove that he has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the object searched. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish the Utah cases in 
which this Court found that the defendants did not have standing 
by stating that the officers established prior to the search that 
the defendants did not own or have a possessory interest in the 
property seized (Br. of App. at 9). In the present case, before 
the officers opened the door to look at the VIN on the safety 
inspection sticker, the officers had significant reason to 
believe that the car was stolen (see subsection B, infra). 
Regardless, whether a defendant has standing to object should not 
depend on the officer's belief regarding the thief's right to 
possession in the vehicle. State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me. 
1974). The reasonableness of the officer's belief that the car 
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was stolen would be of consequence only when reaching the merits 
of defendant's claim. Whether defendant has standing depends on 
his own expectation of privacy. Accord People v. Spies, 615 P.2d 
710 (Colo. 1980). 
In the present case, defendant had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the Mustang that he had stolen. 
Although he made an assertion to Detective Robison that he had 
purchased the vehicle from a local dealership, he made no further 
effort to establish his claim during his attempt to suppress the 
evidence. A mere, unsupported statement of ownership is not 
sufficient to establish standing. When this unsupported claim is 
weighed against the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, it 
is clear that defendant did not establish his standing to 
challenge the officer's opening of the car door in order to view 
the VIN on the door side panel. Accordingly, defendant's claim 
of unlawful search and seizure should be dismissed for want of 
standing. 
B. Assuming Defendant Has Standing to Challenge 
The Search of the Vehicle, the Warrantless Search 
Was Still Lawful. 
If this Court finds that defendant has standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the search, defendant is not 
entitled to the relief he seeks because the officer's search 
(specifically opening the door to compare the VIN located on the 
safety standard sticker side panel of the door) falls within the 
automobile exception of the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1974); 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United 
States, 237 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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In California v. Carney. 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985), the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed its former automobile 
exception cases and stated that the rule was originally based 
upon the readily movable nature of automobiles, citing Carroll. 
The Court noted that an additional basis for the exception exists 
because one's expectation of privacy in an automobile is 
significantly less than one's expectation of privacy in a home or 
office, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 42^ U.S. 364 (1976). 
Id. at 391. The lesser expectation of privacy does not derive 
only from the fact that the interior of a vehicle is usually in 
plain view, but also from the fact that there is "pervasive 
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public 
highways." Ici. at 392. The reduced expectation of privacy stems 
in part from government regulation of vehicles which does not 
extend to a fixed dwelling. 
Relying upon the premise that automobiles are 
justifiably the subject of pervasive regulation by the state, the 
United States Supreme Court recently held that the VIN of an 
automobile, which by law is present either inside the door jamb 
or atop the dashboard, is not subject to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986), the 
Court stated: 
The factors that generally diminish the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in 
automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the 
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN 
plays an important part in the pervasive 
regulation by the government of the 
automobile. A motorist must surely expect 
that such regulation will on occasion require 
the State to determine the VIN of his or her 
vehicle, and the individual's reasonable 
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expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby 
diminished. 
After having established that a VIN is not subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court went on to state 
that when the VIN is visible from outside of the vehicle, there 
is no justification for intrusion into the passenger compartment 
to see it. Justice Powell addressed this seeming contradiction 
in his concurring opinion stating, "an officer's efforts to 
observe the [VIN] need not be subjected to the same scrutiny that 
courts properly apply when police have intruded into a vehicle to 
arrest or to search for evidence of crime." Id. at 120. 
In the present case, Detective Robison received a call 
from the owner of a stolen vehicle (R. 230). She went to the 
location of the vehicle and ran a check on the license number. 
As a result of the check, the officer learned that the vehicle 
was registered to defendant (R. 233). After receiving further 
information from the owner, i.e., that the car had distinctive 
arm rests, tie downs on the hood, a black racing stripe on the 
hood and sides of the car, and a scoop on the front of the car, 
the detective returned to the car (R. 234). The detective and 
Kipp Ingersoll noted the VIN on the dashboard and the car's 
distinctive features and then opened the car door to determine if 
the VIN on the dashboard matched the VIN on the safety standard 
sticker on the door (R. 235). It is clear that the only reason 
the detective entered the car was to examine the VIN. Further, 
Kip Ingersoll testified that there are usually two or more places 
on the vehicle where the VIN is stamped (R. 269). In the present 
case, the officers possessed information that a car had been 
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stolen, and the prior owner gave the officers a detailed 
description of the vehicle. The car examined by the officers 
matched the description given by the owner, and the fact that the 
VIN on the dashboard did not match the stolen vehicle made it 
reasonable for the officers to verify the other VINs on the 
vehicle. 
Further, the warrantless search of the Mustang was 
justified on the basis of probable cause. A "warrantless vehicle 
search is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable 
cause for a search exists." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 
1986). 
Probable cause exists where "the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers's] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that" an offense has 
been or is being committed. 
(Citing Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175-76.) 
The determination of whether probable cause 
exists, therefore, depends upon an 
examination of all the information available 
to the searching officer in light of the 
circumstances as they existed at the time the 
search was made. The trial court's findings 
as to the facts and circumstances pertaining 
to probable cause will not be overturned on 
appeal unless it appears that the trial court 
clearly erred. 
J^ l. at 1088. 
Based upon the following facts, probable cause existed 
to search the vehicle: 1) the owner of a vehicle reported that 
his car had been stolen and that he thought it was located at 
7242 Gardenia Avenue (R. 230-31), 2) he provided police officers 
with a description of the car: a gold, yellpw Mach I Mustang with 
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black racing stripes (R. 231), armrests which had been "redone" 
and which were "very distinctive from the rest of the car," a 
black racing stripe on the hood of the car, a "scoop" on the hood 
of the car, and "tie-downs" on the hood (R. 234); and 3) a Mach I 
Mustang matching the above description was found at 7242 Gardenia 
Avenue (R. 232-34). The officers were confronted with a dilemma 
in the instant case, the description given by the owner of the 
stolen vehicle matched the vehicle located at 7242 Gardenia 
Avenue; however, the VIN on the dashboard did not match that of 
the stolen vehicle. Faced with this dilemma, the officers had 
probable cause to simply open the door for the limited purpose of 
determining whether the VIN on the safety standard sticker 
located on the right side panel of the door matched the VIN on 
the dashboard. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's analysis 
of exigent circumstances set forth in Carney, which held that a 
mobile home parked on a public street came within the automobile 
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, justifies 
the warrantless search for the VIN on the door of the Mustang in 
the present case. 
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, 
or if it is readily capable of such use and 
is found stationary in a place not regularly 
used for residential purposes—temporary or 
otherwise—the two justifications for the 
vehicle exception come into play. First the 
vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the 
turn of an ignition key, if not actually 
moving. Second, there is a reduced 
expectation of privacy stemming from its use 
as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a 
range of police regulation inapplicable to a 
fixed dwelling. At least in these 
circumstances, the overriding societal 
-16-
interests in effective law enforcement 
justify an immediate search before the 
vehicle and its occupants become unavailable. 
Carney, at 393 (footnote omitted). 
Federal cases subsequent to Carney have given a broad 
interpretation to the fourth amendment by allowing warrantless 
searches of automobiles if the search is reasonable in scope and 
supported by probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. 
Grandstaff, 807 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987) (in which the court 
rejected the defendant's argument that no exigent circumstances 
existed because the automobile was in disrepair and was incapable 
of being moved, finding that probable cause is all that is 
necessary to justify a warrantless search); State v. Badgett, 200 
Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986); State v. Akers, 723 
S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. App. 1986). 
In the present case, the Mustang was readily capable of 
being moved by the mere turn of a key. It was clearly not being 
used for residential purposes. The scope of the search was 
limited to locating the VIN on the door and did not constitute an 
intrusion into the interior of the vehicle, 
Defendant also argues that although article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution is almost identical to the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court could 
nevertheless extend the protections of the Utah Constitution to 
the fact of this case. Even if this Court finds that the 
automobile exception requires both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, as demonstrated above, both prongs were met. 
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There is no legitimate basis to extend the protection of the Utah 
Constitution beyond what the Supreme Court ruled in California v. 
Carney and New York v. Class that the Supreme Court ruled the 
fourth amendment provides. 
Because defendant had no expectation of privacy in the 
VIN, and furthermore because probable cause existed to search the 
car, the search of the vehicle was lawful. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
SHORT CONTACT BETWEEN A JUROR AND ONE OF THE 
STATE'S WITNESSES DID NOT WARRANT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error by not granting his motion for mistrial after 
one of the jurors, Agnes Lembke, conversed with a prosecution 
witness, Neil Hailes. 
According to the standard set forth by this Court in 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) , an unauthorized 
encounter between a witness and a juror that is "more than brief 
and inadvertent" raises a presumption of prejudice to the 
defendant which the State must rebut. It is not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of prejudice for the affected juror to 
simply state that he or she would not be influenced. Id. at 281; 
see State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987). However, 
the prosecution can rebut the presumption by a showing that the 
contact did not influence the juror. Factors to be considered 
include the importance of the witness to the prosecution's case, 
the nature and length of the conversation, and whether the 
content of the conversation and the trial court's questioning of 
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those involved regarding its effect is contained in the record in 
order to afford adequate appellate review. Pike at 280. 
The facts of the present case are distinguishable from 
those in Pike and Erickson; the juror-witness contact in the 
present case did not constitute the degree of impropriety that 
warrants the drastic remedy of a new trial. 
In Pijce, the unauthorized juror-witness contact 
involved an important witness for the prosecution, Officer 
Fleming. Fleming was a witness to many of the occurrences 
between the victims and the defendant (who was charged with 
aggravated assault), including a threatening statement the 
defendant directed toward the victims; he w£s also the arresting 
officer. Consequently, his testimony was critical to the jury's 
determination of the defendant's guilt. This Court noted that 
because the officer was an important witness and his credibility 
was a crucial aspect of the State's case, a conversation between 
the officer and a juror concerning the officer's injury raised a 
presumption of prejudice. The record on appeal did not disclose 
the entire content of the conversation; the questioning of those 
involved was brief and incomplete. Under those facts, the bare 
statement of the jurors involved that they would not be affected 
was insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice against 
the defendant. See also Erickson, at 620 (juror's conversation 
with a State's witness, a police officer, discussing family 
members and the officer's feelings toward her job raised a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice). The witness' status was 
important to this Court's decision in Pike# that is, the witness 
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was "important" to the case and the witness—a police officer— 
was a person of authority. 
The record of the proceedings below reflects that just 
prior to trial, after the jury had been selected, some of the 
4 jurors were waiting outside the courtroom. Witness Hailes 
walked over to where juror Agnes Lembke was sitting in order to 
share an ashtray that she was using (R. 164-65). A brief, 
"general conversation" ensued in which Mr. Hailes told Ms. Lembke 
that he planned to go to Eureka and hoped that the trial would 
not last too long (R. 164-65). Mr. Hailes also expressed 
surprise that none of the jurors had raised their hands when 
asked during voir dire whether they believed that police officers 
were more believable than other witnesses, and Hailes indicated 
that he would probably have raised his hand had he been asked 
that question (R. 166). Nothing further appears to have been 
said between the two. 
It is apparent from the record that Judge Dee was aware 
of this Court's ruling in Pike and knew that where the juror-
witness contact is more than merely incidental, the State must 
rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant (see R. 334-
35). The record reflects that the State rebutted this 
presumption through the questioning of those involved (R. 338-
42). 
Based upon the following factors, the trial court 
reasonably concluded that the State had rebutted the presumption 
4 
The record of the inquiry made by the trial court regarding the 
juror-witness contact is reproduced in its entirely in Appendix 
A. 
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of prejudice. First, a major distinction between the present 
case and Pike lies in the nature of the testimony offered by the 
witness who had come into contact with the juror. In Pike, 
Officer Fleming was an "important" prosecution witness. :id. at 
280. Mr. Hailes testimony, on the other h>and, was virtually 
inconsequential to the outcome of the case. His testimony merely 
confirmed that the Mustang in defendant's possession had been 
stolen, an issue that was not contested at trial. Further, he 
was not a witness to either of the crimes charged. Defendant 
conceded that the car was stolen (R. 312-13), but argued that 
David Luce, the salesman from State Auto Sales, had misidentified 
him as the man who had taken the vehicle (R. 310-12). The 
substance of Mr. Hailes' testimony was never challenged. As the 
prosecutor stated, Mr. Hailes was an "incidental witness" whose 
testimony "simply rounded out the story so that the jury would 
get the entire picture" (R. 341). Mr. Hailes was not the victim 
in this case, he had never met or been wronged by the defendant, 
he was not at the scene of the crime, and he did not appear to 
have an interest in the outcome of the case. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded that the 
contact between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was not prejudicial. 
Furthermore, Hailes was not a police officer or a 
person of similar authority likely to unduly influence a juror. 
5 
In Pike, the defendant was charged with three counts of 
aggravated assault, and there was conflicting testimony regarding 
the events that had transpired at the scene of the crime. 
Officer Fleming "was both the arresting officer at the scene of 
the altercation," and he heard the defendant make incriminating 
statements to the effect that he would "take care of" the assault 
victims. 
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From the juror's perspective, Hailes was simply a fellow who had 
gotten drunk one night and demolished his 1973 Mustang. Hailes 
and Lembke merely conversed briefly while sharing an ashtray. It 
is unlikely that such a brief encounter with an insignificant 
witness had any impact on Lembke's decision. 
Mr. Hailes' personal observation that police officers 
were more credible than others, would not have impacted the 
credibility of Detective Robison and Kipp Ingersoll because 
neither person's testimony was disputed at trial. Robison and 
Ingersoll established that the VIN tag on the dashboard of the 
Mustang was unlawfully attached, that the car was stolen, and 
that it was found in the possession of the defendant (R. 230-49, 
265-86). Nothing that Robison or Ingersoll said detracted from 
defendant's claim that he had been misidentified as the thief and 
that he did not know the car was stolen. Because police officer 
credibility was not at issue in this case, the trial court had 
additional justification to find that defendant had not been 
prejudiced by the brief conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr. 
Hailes. Ms. Lembke's denial that her conversation with Mr. 
Hailes influenced her, along with the fact that Hailes was not a 
key prosecution witness and was not in a position to influence 
Ms. Lembke, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice 
resulting from the contact. See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 
97-98 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring). 
Another important distinction between Pike and the 
present case is that here the relevant matters were fully aired 
in the court below. In Pike, this Court expressed concern that 
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the "questioning [of the officer] was brief and did not disclose 
the entire contents of the conversation." 712 P.2d at 280. The 
police officer began to tell the trial court in chambers about 
the discussion with the jurors; he informed the court that he and 
the jurors had discussed his accident but he was then interrupted 
by the court and not allowed to finish his Narrative of the 
conversation. 2^# a t 279. There was "no other evidence as to 
the scope and subject matter of the conversation." Jki. at 280. 
It appears to have been a critical factor in this Court's 
reversal of the conviction that the record was not sufficient to 
determine whether the defendant had been prejudiced as a result 
of the encounter between Officer Fleming and the jurors. Such 
deficiencies were not present in the instant case. Juror Lembke 
was questioned in considerable deta:.l by the trial court, by the 
prosecutor and by defense counsel (see Appendix A). Neither 
party had any further questions for Ms. Lembke. She said all 
that she could say, and the record adequately supports the 
conclusion that defendant was not prejudicqd. 
Moreover, while they were not entirely dispositive, Ms. 
Lembke's statements to the court were significant. She said that 
she and Mr. Hailes had not discussed the facts of the case at all 
(R. 165). She declared that she would remain unbiased towards 
either side, that she would not accord any greater weight to Mr. 
Hailes' testimony than to that of other witnesses, and that the 
comment regarding the testimony of police dfficers would not 
affect her deliberations in any way (R. 168). The trial court, 
who observed her demeanor as she answered the questions put to 
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her, was uniquely capable of determining whether she had been 
influenced by the contact with Mr. Hailes, and his conclusion 
that there was no need to grant a mistrial was proper. 
The record is devoid of evidence to support defendant's 
contention that a juror, in addition to Ms. Lembke, "stood nearby 
and apparently heard at least a portion of the conversation" (Br. 
of App. at 27). The record establishes that this second juror—a 
young, unnamed, blonde-haired woman who had been sitting next to 
Ms. Lembke—was not present when the encounter between Ms. Lembke 
and Mr. Hailes took place. Ms. Lembke told Judge Dee, "The girl 
sitting next to me there. As he [Mr. Hailes] was walking up to 
use the ashtray, she left, and he used the ashtray" (R. 167). 
The record simply does not support defendant's claim that the 
second juror heard any portion of the conversation; to infer 
otherwise, would be mere speculation. The trial court appeared 
to be satisfied that there was no need to question any juror 
other than Ms. Lembke (see R. 164-69). If defendant believed 
that this second juror had been in contact with Mr. Hailes, 
defendant should have requested that the judge take the juror 
into chambers and question her as he had Ms. Lembke, thus 
clearing the air of any impropriety. Defense counsel did not do 
so, however, and counsel's failure to timely raise the issue 
precludes doing so on appeal State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 
254 (Utah 1983). 
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POINT III 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONTENTION THAT JURORS SAW HIM IN SHACKLES OR 
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OTHERWISE DENIED 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Defendant contends that during the noon recess prior to 
the jury beginning deliberations, two jurors saw defendant 
"shackled and in police custody" (Br. of App. at 30). Defendant 
likens this alleged viewing of defendant's restraint to the 
prejudice which follows a "situation in which the defendant is 
brought into court with prison garb or shackles on" (Br. of App. 
at 30). 
The record simply does not support defendant's 
contention. On the final day of trial, after closing arguments 
and prior to deliberation, the trial court allowed the jury to be 
taken to lunch, accompanied by the bailiff (R. 321-22). After 
the jury returned its verdict and prior to freing excused, at 
defense counsel's request, the trial court Risked the jurors 
whether they had seen defendant in police custody when leaving 
for lunch (R. 327-28). One juror, Ms. Bragg, stated that she 
saw him with a man wearing a suit but did not see him get into a 
police car (R. 328). Another juror, Ms. Broadhead, while sitting 
in the back of a station wagon on the way to the restaurant saw 
defendant approaching the car (R. 328). Contrary to defendant's 
representations, nothing in the record indicates that defendant 
was shackled or in police custody; nothing indicates that the man 
wearing a "suit" was wearing a police uniform. The record does 
The transcript of relevant proceedings is contained in its 
entirety as Appendix B. 
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not evince that the car defendant was approaching was a police 
car, or, that if it was a police car, that it was identified as 
such. Finally, the record does not show that defendant was 
handcuffed, much less shackled, or that if he were handcuffed, 
the jurors saw, or were in a position to see, the handcuffs. It 
is clear that defendant, himself, was wearing plain clothes—not 
prison garb—during the proceedings (R. 332). 
Had the jurors seen defendant in prison garb and 
shackles, being escorted by uniformed guards to a marked police 
vehicle, there might have been an issue as to whether his right 
to a fair trial had been violated. However, this did not occur 
in the present case. Defendant, who was in plain clothes, was 
seen briefly as he walked with a man wearing a suit down some 
stairs and in the direction of a vehicle which may or may not 
have borne police markings. The evidence against defendant was 
overwhelming, and both of the jurors involved stated that their 
seeing defendant on that occasion had no effect upon their 
7 
deliberations (R. 328-29). 
7 
Assuming this Court accepts defendant's representations of the 
record, defendant's argument nonetheless lacks merit. Defendant 
relies on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Chess v. 
Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) and People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 
1322 (Cal. 1976) to support his contention that a mistrial should 
have been granted. Estelle v. Williams and Chess v. Smith are 
cases in which the defendants were required to wear prison 
clothes during trial and are, therefore, distinguishable. In 
People v. Duran, the Supreme Court of California stated that a 
brief observation by jurors of a defendant in shackles either 
inside or outside the courtroom does not generally constitute 
prejudicial error. Accord Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th 
Cir. 1973). The Duran court found prejudicial error where the 
defendant was seen shackled by the jurors in the courtroom 
throughout the course of the trial. In the present case, 
defendant was at no time required to appear in court in shackles. 
The Duran court also noted that although "an accused is entitled 
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Defendant'8 constitutional right to a fair trial 
bestowed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution were not violated. Th^re simply was no 
impropriety on any level, and certainly not a trial defect which 
rises to the level of a constitutional violation of his right to 
a fair trial. If this Court were to find a constitutional 
violation, it is clear that any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Hackford, 737 p.2d 200 (Utah 1987). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH 
THEFT AND POSSESSION OF A STOLEN MOTOR 
VEHICLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Defendant was charged with theft of a vehicle pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) which states: "A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof." As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978), theft 
of an "operable motor vehicle" is a second degree felony. 
Defendant was also charged with possession of a stolen vehicle 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-112 (1981) which states: 
Any person who, with intent to procure or 
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has 
reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers 
possession of the same from or to another, or 
who has in his possession any vehicle which 
7 
Cont. to appear during the progress of his trial free of 
shackles, . . . it was permissible to transport the prisoner to 
court in handcuffs and to keep him in such restraints until he 
entered the court room." Ici. at 1326. See also United States v. 
Larkin, 417 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1969) (no prejudicial error when a 
juror shared an elevator with the defendant while the defendant 
was handcuffed and in the custody of a United States marshall); 
O'Shea v. United States, 400 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1968). 
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he knows or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an 
officer of the law engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty as such officer, is 
guilty of a felony. 
Defendant argues that he was erroneously convicted of 
both theft of a vehicle and possession of the stolen vehicle, 
contending that the latter was a lesser-included offense of the 
theft charge. He also claims that the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to give a lesser-included offense 
instruction to the jury; specifically, that possession of a 
stolen vehicle is a lesser-included offense of theft in this 
case. 
A. Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Theft and 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. 
Defendant claims that this Court's interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3) (a) (1978) as set-forth in State v. 
Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983), serves to preclude his 
convictions on theft of a vehicle and possession of a stolen 
vehicle because under the criteria in Hill his possession of the 
stolen Mustang constituted a lesser-included offense of theft of 
the vehicle (Br. of App. 34-35). However, under the 
circumstances of this case, defendant was properly convicted of 
both theft and possession of a stolen vehicle. 
A Hill analysis is not necessary under the 
circumstances of this case since this case involved two distinct 
acts by defendant—one constituted theft and the other possession 
of a stolen vehicle. Whether a greater-lesser offense 
relationship exists in a particular case under either Hill or 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) (which sets forth the 
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test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a requested 
lesser-included offense instruction), is anl issue only where a 
single act of the defendant is involved. For example, in a 
criminal homicide case the question may be whether the 
defendant's single act of killing constituted second degree 
murder or manslaughter (a lesser-included offense of second 
degree murder). If the defendant had committed two acts of 
killing within a single criminal episode, one constituting second 
degree murder and the other manslaughter, the defendant could not 
successfully argue that, because the two offenses fall within the 
greater-lesser offense relationship, he could be convicted of 
only one offense. It is clear that if Mthe crimes were a result 
of separate and distinct acts that resulted in separate and 
distinct crimes," a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for 
each of the offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. 
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986). See also State v. 
Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 
1174, 1178 (Utah 1985). 
Although defendant cites numerous cases holding that an 
individual could not be convicted of both theft and possession, 
the defendants in those cases were found in possession of stolen 
goods not long after they had taken them. The possession grew 
out of, and was incidental to, the thefts involved. However, 
M[w]hen there is evidence of complete divorcement between the 
theft and a subsequent receiving, such as when the thief has 
disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a 
transaction separate from the original theft, conviction on both 
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charges would be proper.M People v. Jaramillo, 129 Cal. Rptr. 
306, 548 P.2d 706, 710 n. 8 (Cal. 1976). Accord People v. 
Kyllonen, 402 Mich. 135, 262 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1978) (a sale or 
transfer of stolen property by the thief marks the end of the 
original crime). 
In defendant's case, the information charged him with 
two separate crimes on different dates: theft on June 16, 1981, 
and possession of a stolen vehicle on June 6, 1985. The jury 
instructions also alleged that defendant committed the theft on 
June 16, 1981 (R. 69) and the crime of possession of stolen 
property on June 6, 1985 (R. 70). 
The victims of the two crimes are distinct. Theft is a 
violation of the criminal code; the victim was Mr. Padilla. 
Possession of a stolen vehicle is a violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Act and is a regulatory violation. Further, the four 
year gap between the theft charge and the possession charge in 
the instant case precludes defendant's contention that the acts 
derived from a single criminal episode. As a result of this gap, 
evidence presented to convict defendant of the theft charge 
necessarily differed from that evidence presented to convict 
defendant of possession four years later. See State v. Branch, 
743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987). 
Proof adduced at trial established that defendant stole 
the Mustang from State Auto Sales in June of 1981 (R. 185-89). 
Defendant was imprisoned in the Utah State Prison sometime in the 
next year or two, although the record does not disclose the exact 
date, for stealing a truck valued at about $80,000 (R. 348). See 
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also State v, Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983) (this same 
defendant appealed his conviction for theft of the truck). 
Defendant transferred the stolen Mustang to his brother-in-law 
(R. 293) prior to entering prison. Upon his release from prison 
on February 12, 1985 (R. 348), defendant was seen driving the 
stolen Mustang (R. 191, 348) and was later found in possession of 
the car (R. 239). Defendant's conscious decision to again take 
possession of the Mustang was an act additional to, and distinct 
from, the original theft. Thus, there was a "complete 
divorcement" between the first and second crimes. Jaramillo, at 
710 n. 8. 
In People v. Malmut, 16 Cal. App. 3d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
782 (Cal. 1971), the defendant was charged with and convicted of 
committing separate transactions on different dates: grand theft 
on December 8, 1968, and a violation of the California vehicle 
code, driving an automobile without the owner's permission, on 
February 5, 1969. The Malmut court stated^ 
Here, there was not only a lapse of a 
substantial period of time (62 days), but 
there was also a showing that the vehicle was 
not being driven in one continuous journey 
away from the locus of the theft. The 
driving charge was in an entirely different 
location and obviously for purposes 
unconnected with the original taking. 
Moreover, not only was there a switch in 
license plates and registration slip, but 
there was also a placement of the motor and 
removal of the serial numbers from the body 
of the car—combined operations which would 
be considered a major alteration of the 
vehicle. 
Id. at 784. 
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In Malmut the court found the defendant guilty of both 
crimes based upon the lapse of time between the theft and when 
the defendant was seen with the altered vehicle. The present 
case, in contrast, involves an even greater separation of the 
acts of theft and possession wherein defendant actually 
relinguished possession for a significant period of time and 
regained possession at a later time. Finding that the "crime of 
theft by no means includes retention and possession of the stolen 
goods for a period in excess of four years," the Utah Court of 
Appeals held it was proper to allow the jury to convict defendant 
on both charges. Larocco, 742 P.2d at 97. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Refused Defendant's 
Instruction That Possession of a Stolen Vehicle 
is a Lesser-Included Offense of Theft of the 
Vehicle. 
Relying on State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), 
defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury that possession of a stolen vehicle is a 
lesser-included offense in this case. This Court held in Baker 
that the trial court is obligated to instruct on a lesser-
included offense only when "there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." j[d. at 159; Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-1-402(4) (1978). 
In the present case, the evidence presented at trial to 
establish defendant's theft of the Mustang was not ambiguous or 
subject to an alternative interpretation requiring the court to 
instruct on the lesser-included offense of possession. David 
Luce positively identified defendant as the person who had been 
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at State Auto Sales on three occasions to talk with him about the 
Mustang. Immediately after the theft, he told the police and 
others that defendant resembles Dom Delouise (R. 189-90); it is 
apparent that the resemblance is striking (R. 300, 303). Luce 
recognized defendant some four years later as soon as he saw 
defendant in the showroom of Valley Ford (R. 190). He 
unequivocably identified defendant at trial. The only point of 
identification of defendant on which Luce was apparently not 
exact, was his apparent underestimation of defendant's weight. 
Not only was Luce's identification of defendant extremely solid, 
defendant was found to be in possession of the stolen car. There 
simply was no reasonable basis upon which to acquit defendant of 
theft and convict only of possession of a stolen vehicle. 
There must be a rational basis for acquitting a 
defendant of a greater offense and convicting of a lesser-
included offense. A defendant's "frivolous" contentions to the 
contrary cannot support the assertion that the trial court erred 
in not charging the jury on the lesser offense included. See 
State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
Failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that, 
based upon the facts in this case that possession of a stolen 
vehicle is a lesser-included offense of theft of the vehicle some 
four years earlier was not error. Defendant is not entitled to a 
new trial on this basis. If this Court were to conclude that 
defendant could not be convicted of both offenses—the crime of 
theft and possession of a stolen vehicle as prohibited by the 
motor vehicle code—the proper remedy woulcf be to order that the 
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possession charge be vacated. In State v. Hill/ 674 P.2d 96, 98 
(Utah 1983), this Court stated: 
When a defendant has been improperly 
convicted of both a greater and a lesser 
offense, it is appropriate to regard the 
conviction on the lesser offense as mere 
surplusage, which does not invalidate the 
conviction and sentence on the greater 
offense. United States v. Howard, 507 F.2d 
559 (8th Cir. 1974). 
Accord Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619, 621 (Alaska App. 1981); 
People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1981). In no event is 
defendant entitled to have his theft conviction overturned. 
Two separate situations involving lesser-included 
offenses issues commonly arise. In the first situation, the 
defendant is charged with both the greater and the lesser 
offense. The jury is instructed as to the elements of both 
offenses and finds the defendant guilty of both, when the 
defendant could properly have been convicted of only one of the 
offenses. These were the circumstances in State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). This Court found the proper remedy was to 
invalidate the conviction for the lesser offense and affirm the 
conviction for the greater. JEd. at 98. In the second situation, 
the jury is improperly instructed, over the defendant's 
objection, that it must either convict the defendant of the 
greater offense or acquit him. The jury, which has never been 
allowed to consider the possibility that the defendant may have 
been guilty of a lesser offense instead of the greater, convicts 
the defendant of the greater offense. These latter circumstances 
arose in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), and here the 
defendant's remedy was to have his conviction for the greater 
offense reversed and remanded. 
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Attempting to apply both Hill and Baker remedies to the 
present case, defendant urges that he is entitled to have his 
conviction on the lesser possession charge vacated and to have 
the greater theft conviction remanded for retrial. The present 
case, however, in plainly a Hill-type case, where both the 
greater and lesser offenses went to the jury, and the defendant 
was convicted of both. Baker is inapposite, and defendant's 
attempts to gain a double remedy through the application of both 
Hill and Baker are meritless. At most, defendant is entitled to 
have his conviction for possession vacated, and the theft 
conviction affirmed. Hill 674 P.2d at 98. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the trial court and to uphold the convictions for theft 
and possession of a stolen vehicle. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this V # day of November, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
(pOft-l/ BARBARA BEARNSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
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1 other chances if you want to look at my chambers later on. 
2 But we'll be in recess on this case until 2:00 p.m. 
3 (Whereupon, court recessed 
4 at 12:15 p.m. and reconvened at 2:12 p.m. in chambers with 
5 I Court and counsel present.) 
6 THE COURT: Hi, M r s . jLembke. Come on in. 
7 The record should show that Mrs. Lembke, one 
8 of the jurors in the case before the Court, is in chambers 
g with the lawyer for the defendant and the prosecutor 
10 because there was an observed conversation between the 
11 juror and one of the persons out in the hall who is called 
12 as a witness for the prosecution. And there is a question 
13 raised about the conversation, whetheif you talked v:ith this 
14 witness about the case. 
15 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
16 THE COURT: What were you talking about, 
17 if you don't mind us finding out about it? 
» JUROR LEMBKE: Well, first of all, he 
19 pulled the light switch in the hall and had mentioned that 
20 it worked, and then he did the other switch. And then 
21 he just was saying he hoped it didn't - - the case didn ft 
22 go long, that he was going to Eureka, just driving down 
23 there, where I lived. Just general conversation. Nothing 
24 at all about the case. 
R
 THE COURT: Did you know who he was? 
coo: 
4m I 
1 JUROR LEMBKE: I thought I recognized 
2 his sweater. We shared an ashtray. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think 
4 that there's anything else about the conversation as far 
5 I as that's concerned. It's a question of friendliness or 
6 whatever that sometimes raises a question about what you 
7 would think of him as a witness or if he was called or 
8 not called, whatever. We have to be very careful about 
9 I that sort of thing. 
101 JUROR LEMBKE: I understand. 
n I THE COURT: I guess what we ought to do 
12 is isolate everybody from everybody in terms of that 
13 sort of thing. Maybe the jurors should go down to the 
14 other end of the hall, the City end, while people are 
15 out in the hall. You don't know who they are, and I don't 
16 know who they are. And that would end speculation. 
17 Do you feel comfortable about the whole thing? 
18 Otherwise - -
19 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. As long as that was 
21 the substance of your conversation. 
22 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. The case wasn't 
23 mentioned at all. 
24 MR. H0RT0N: Do you feel you can still 
26 be fair to both sides and not be influenced by the 
1 conversation out in the hall? 
2 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes, because we didn't 
31 talk about anything involving anything. I mean I donft 
4 know why he's here. I don't, you know, other than the 
5 I fact he is a witness. I have no idea, 
6 I MR. HORTON: Do you feel you could 
7 weigh his testimony the same as any otjher witnesses if 
8 he testifies and he is subject to cross-examination and 
9 so forth? 
10 JUROR LEMBKE: Yes. 
11 M S . REMAL: Do you feel as though the 
12 fact you had this conversation makes him more believable -
13 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
14 M S . REMAL: - - because you already 
15 talked to him? 
16 JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
17 He did mention one thing. That he was 
18 surprised at the questions that were asked. And that 
W he was - - he was surprised, and that he, himself, would 
20 have said, yes, when you asked if you would believe a 
21 policeman more than any other person. That was the only 
22 comment that was made. And - - and I didn't - - when the 
23 judge asked if we would believe a policeman more than any 
24 other person, and he said he probably would have raised 
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THE COURT: If he had been a juror? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Had he been a juror, 
that would be his, you know - -
MS. REMAL: So you did have that bit of 
conversation concerning the jury selection? 
JUROR LEMBKE: Yeah. He did say that. 
I made no comment. 
MS. REMAL: Was there any other discussion 
about the questions asked on jury selection or anything 
like that? 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. And he asked me if 
I had ever served on a jury before, and I said, "No." 
THE COURT: Any other jurors there while 
all of this was going on? 
JUROR LEMBKE: One. The girl sitting 
next to me there. As he was walking up to use the ashtray, 
she left, and he used the ashtray. 
THE COURT: The young lady on your left? 
JUROR LEMBKE: On my right. The blonde. 
(Indicating.) 
THE COURT: Okay. 
JUROR LEMBKE: Or she left just as he was 
walking by. The one right there. VJe were out there 
before - -
THE COURT: Okay. 
30 
MR. HORTON: The comment that he made to 
you about the police officer, would that affect your 
deliberation in any way? 
JUROR LEMBKE: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You can 
sit back in the jury box. 
(Whereupon, Juror Lembke 
left the chambers.) 
Miss Remal, you can make your motion. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would move 
for a mistrial. I'm sure that Mrs. Lembke didn't mean 
anything by her conversation with the witness, but I'm 
still concerned that there was a little bit of conversation 
pertaining to the case, at least to the jury selection, 
that went on, and the comment about him saying that he 
would have answered the question differently than she 
apparently did. I'm just a little concerned there may be 
some influence depending on that. And as I said before, 
the fact that she had this conversation with him, I'm 
afraid that even though not consciously she may just find 
him more believable because she may think he's a nice guy, 
having had this conversation. And I'm a little bit 
concerned about that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Horton? 




1 they had and the fact she's been in here and questioned 
2 about it, my impression would be if anything she would 
3 try to compensate in favor of the defense. And I don't 
4 think there's a basis for a mistrial, so we would oppose 
5I the motion at this time. 
6 THE COURT: My perception of the 
7 converstation's content and the response of the juror to 
g the questions about the conversation leads the Court to 
9 I believe there's no basis for a mistrial. 
Motion is denied. 
MS. REMAL: Well -
12 I THE COURT: I guess we can do - -
,3 MS. REMAL: Do it? 
14 I THE COURT: I guess We can go do it. 
15 Wait. Wait. Wait. 
16 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would like to 
17 renew my Motion to Supress the evidence that was taken as 
18 a result of the search of the car on tne day of Mr. Larocco's 
19 arrest and just make it clear to the court there's a 
20 continuing objection to the evidence obtained as a result 
2i of that search, so I don't have to jump up and down through 
22 the trial. 
23 THE COURT: Motion is denied, and the 
24 I ruling of the Court you already have. 




decided by this jury. 
I appreciate your being here for the purpose 
of this experience and on behalf of the citizens of the 
community, we wish to thank you for your participation. 
You've done a good job listening to the evidence it 
appeared to me. I don't know anything about your job in 
the deliberation room or make no comment on how you make 
a determination on the verdict, but I think you were 
attentive, and that's what counts. You have proven again 
the system at least can be employed to make a determination 
to find the truth. And I appreciate your participation. 
The jury is excused. Thank you very much. 
MS. REMAL: Excuse mfe, Your Honor. 
Before you excuse the jury, may Mr. Horton and I approach 
the bench? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon, there was a 
discussion off the record between Court and counsel at the 
bench, out of the hearing of the jury.) 
Counsel have raised an issue, and I need to 
explore it with you, ladies and gentlemen. 
The defendant indicates that during the time 
of the noon recess when you were leavipg to go to lunch, 
while the bailiff had you in custody, he took you down to 
a place where the defendant was entering a police car, 
i;<j'or:7 
£L 
1 showing that he was in custody. And I wondered whether any 
2 of you saw that. I suppose what I'm saying is the bailiff 
3 should have made sure that situation didn't occur. That's 
* what the complaint is. 
5 Any of you see the defendant getting into a 
6 police car? 
7 JUROR BRAGG: I saw him, but I didn't 
8 see him go get into a police car. I saw him go downstairs, 
9 but he was with a guy with a suit on. 
10 THE COURT: Just walking down the stairs? 
11 JUROR BRAGG: Yeah. 
12 JUROR BROADHEAD: I saw him when he 
13 was approaching the car. I probably wouldn't have seen 
14 him, but we were sitting in the back of a station wagon 
15 facing that way. 
16 I THE COURT: You were sitting in the back 
17 of the station wagon? 
18 JUROR BROADHEAD: Uh^huh. 
19 THE COURT: Whose station wagon is that? 
20 THE BAILIFF: This lady here. (Indicating. 
21 THE COURT: Oh. You rode over to the 
22 China Village? 
23 THE BAILIFF: Yeah. They didn't want 
24 I to freeze their toes. 





























THE COURT: Did that have any influence 
on your determination in this case? 
You're shaking your head, Miss Bragg. It didn't 
have any effect - -
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: - - on your decision in the 
case, influence your deliberations? 
JUROR BRAGG: No. 
THE COURT: Miss Broadhead, how about 
you? 
JUROR BROADHEAD: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else see him get into 
a police car? 
All right. You're excused. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the jury was 
excused at 3:54 p.m.) 
THE COURT: What dq you want to do about 
sentencing? 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, Mr. Larocco has 
indicated that he would prefer to be sentenced at a later 
date. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. REMAL: We ask that a pre-sentence 
report be prepared. 
GOO2::9 
